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INTRODUCTION

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972' gives to the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) comprehensive powers to
* B.A., 1963 Haverford College; M.A., 1965 Stanford University;
J.D., 1972, Dickinson School of Law; Associate, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius,
Washington, D.C.
1. P.L. 92-500, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq. (1972) [hereinafter cited as
"The Act of 1972," or as "the Act"].

deal with water pollution throughout the United States. The existing Federal Water Pollution Control Act has been completely
replaced, and several other important federal statutes (such as the
Refuse Act of 1899 and the National Environmental Protection
Act of 1969) have been substantially affected. The new federal act
is lengthy and far-reaching in the extent to which federal regulation will encompass water pollution control traditionally left to the
states. This paper will highlight only those2 sections of immediate
interest to industrial dischargers of effluents.
The Act of 1972 approaches the control of water pollution from
two directions by imposing effluent discharge limitations and by
imposing water quality standards. The emphasis is on the former.
The Act provides for an intricate system of federal-state interaction in the administration and enforcement of the Act, with emphasis on state responsibility. EPA retains plenary power to initiate or approve all effluent discharge limitations as well as all
water quality standards.
Pollution control will begin with limitations on the discharge
of pollutants imposed at the source in the form of prescribed levels of effluent reduction. Where these basically technological requirements fail to achieve desired water quality, stricter effluent
discharge limits may result.
Effluent discharge limitations will be enforced in the first instance through the issuance of a permit to discharge, which will
not be granted unless the situs state of discharge certifies that the
discharge will comply with the requirements of the Act. Dischargers of pollutants who violate the conditions of their permits,
and dischargers operating without a permit, are in violation of the
Act, and are subject to heavy fines or even imprisonment.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 contains a
number of ambiguities and conflicts. The procedural and interpretational questions, and jurisdictional problems which are expected
to arise will have to be ironed out in practice. The Act bears the
scars of years of legislative wrangling and compromise, so that, in
part, it seems almost self-contradictory. In addition, the intricate
structure of federal-state interplay makes some provisions of the
Act contingent upon future state action.
2. This paper will not attempt to enter into the discussion about what
the larger, more philosophical "goals" of the Act are. Proponents of the
hard line on water pollution control point to legislative history in support
of the claim that "swimmable water" is the 1983 goal and that "no discharge" at all is the 1985 goal. But Congress, in fact, was unable to agree
that such a hard line could be justified against possible severe economic
dislocations, as one result of which many of the limitations and prohibitions of the Act are modified by references to the costs involved. The
extent to which cost-benefit considerations may be available to ameliorate
the requirements of specific sections of the Act will be discussed in the
context of these sections as they arise. General treatment of the subject

soon becomes vagarious.
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The object of this paper is twofold: To give the reader some
appreciation for the major substantive portions of the Act as they
affect industrial users, and to outline the procedural steps along
the path toward compliance with the important provisions of the
Act. The paper is intended to be informative, but it should be recognized that many areas of the Act will not be discussed, such as
the research and related programs section, the oil spill and ocean
discharge provisions, and most of the title concerning grants for
construction of public treatment works (except to the extent that
industrial users will be directly affected). Moreover, many of the
problems which will arise under the Act cannot, at this time, be
foreshadowed in the absence of actual factual context. Similarly,
it is not the purpose of this paper to advise a particular course of
action. Specific recommendations may be reliably given only upon
review of the factual situation.
I.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION UNDER

THE ACT OF 1972

The first question raised by the Act of 1972 is that of federal
jurisdiction, and the constitutional basis upon which it rests. The
Act of 1972 extends federal power over water pollution to all navigable waters. "Navigable waters" is the traditional jurisdictional
formulation of federal authority over inland waters. But the Act
defines navigable waters uniquely as "the waters of the United
States including the territorial seas."
For various special purposes, federal power also extends under the Act to the oceans and
contiguous zones as defined in certain treaties of the United States. 4
It is arguable that federal jurisdiction has taken a quantum jump
through the definitional coup de main just cited. Solid arguments
can be made that federal power does not reach as far as all the
waters of the United States, although recent federal case law has
shown a tendency to assume that it does.
The report of the House Committee on Public Works, where
the House version of the Act originated, does not elaborate upon
the assumed constitutional basis for the breadth of federal power
asserted in the Act:
One term the Committee was reluctant to define was the
term 'navigable waters.' The reluctance was based on the
fear that any interpretation would be read narrowly. However, this is not the Committee's intent. The Committee
fully intends that the term 'navigable waters' be given the
broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencum3. Act of 1972, § 502 (7).
4. Id.at § 502(9) & (10).

bered by agency determinations which have been made or
may be made for administrative purposes.5
At another point the Committee report states:
Thus, the Committee rejected in most instances suggestions
for preemption by the Federal Government and preempted
the States only where the situation warranted it based
6
upon the urgent need for uniformity ....
The preemption doctrine is generally applied only in areas of concurrent state-federal jurisdiction, so that when the Committee
states that it has declined to preempt, it has begged the real question-viz., whether the federal and statute authority over nonnavigable waters are concurrent. In any event, whatever terms
the committee report may put upon it, the Act of 1972 gives the
federal authorities ultimate power over all aspects of state par7
ticipation.
Two distinct sources of federal jurisdiction over water pollution have been suggested: navigable waters and the "general welfare" power. Discussion of both follows.
A. Navigable Waters.
The Constitution does not give Congress direct power to regulate the waters of the United States. Federal power over American waterways is derivative, and has its genesis in the commerce
clause (Article I, § 8). Because Congress can regulate interstate
commerce it can, it was asserted, regulate navigable waterways.
Frequent litigation reduced the definition of navigability to formulistic terms dealing mainly in generalities which covered a wide
range of factual situations. While some cases hold with a basically
common-sense definition of navigability, other cases have upheld
federal power over matters which affect navigablity more remotely.
Flood protection, watershed development, and by-products of the
general use of water for commerce have been held by the Supreme
Court to be matters subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause." Nonetheless, the underpinning of federal authority
has remained the concept of navigability in some form.
Federal water pollution measures prior to the Act of 1972 observed the distinction between navigable and non-navigable waters,
5. H.R. REP. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972 [hereinafter
cited as H.R. 92-911].
6. Id. at 136.
7. Whether Congress has the power to do so or not, it appears reasonably certain that the Act seeks to establish federal supremacy in water
pollution control because of widespread dissatisfaction with the progress
the states had been making in cleaning up the nation's waters. See generally F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §§ 2-66 to 70 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as GRAD].

8. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311
U.S. 377 (1940).
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and the constitutional principle which underlies it-the principle of
state sovereignty. For example, the Act of 194810 authorized the
Surgeon General to assist the states, and the Act encouraged interstate compacts and uniform legislation. The Act of 1948 also provided that the United States could sue violators of the law only
with the consent of the state in which the violation occurred. Legislation enacted between 1948 and 1961 permitted direct federal enforcement of anti-pollution laws only in interstate waters. The Act
of 196111 extended federal abatement authority to navigable intrastate waters, but required the permission of owners of the waters
to sue the polluters. The Water Quality Act of 196512 set water
quality standards only for interstate waters. Not until the Act of
1972, in other words, did a pollution control act extend on its face
beyond the boundaries of navigable or interstate waters. And, of
course, the Act of 1972 honors the traditional navigable waters formula, but through its definitional coup the Act of 1972 obliterates
the historical constitutional distinction between navigable and
non-navigable waters by defining navigable waters to be all waters.
In a closely related area, that of apportionment of water (e.g.,
for use in irrigation projects) among states served by common
bodies of water, the same respect for the limits of federal jurisdiction is evident in the case law. States have frequently quarrelled
over the apportionment of waters which flow through more than
one state, and in such cases, the solution has invariably been the
formation of multi-state compacts, rather than the exercise of federal authority.13 In fact, the landmark case in the field held that
federal authority did not extend to apportioning water among
states for irrigation projects. 14 The concept of navigability, in
some form, has always circumscribed federal power over water regulation. It is interesting to note that a characteristic feature of
the many multi-state water compacts is the protection afforded
state sovereignty by use of veto power given to each state party to
the compact.' 5
9. See generally H.R. 92-911 at 66-68.
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1151-60 (1948), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-60
(Supp. 1972).
11. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-60 (1961), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-60
(Supp. 1972).
12. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1161-60 (1965), as amended, P.L. 92-500 (1972).
13. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Hinderlider v.
LaPlata, 304 U.S. 92 (1937).
14. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 86-87 (1907).
15. See, e.g., Potomac River Pollution, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 741-43
(1967), a multi-state compact to which Pennsylvania is a party for the

control of pollution in the Potomac Basin. The Compact provides that:

The pattern of respect for the limitations inherent in the concept of navigability evinced by the case law and legislation set out
above has not, however, been unbroken. The Refuse Act of 189916
prohibits the discharge of matter into the navigable waters of the
United States "or into any tributary of any navigable water from
which [any refuse matter] shall float or be washed into such navigable water." Interpretations of the Refuse Act have indirectly
raised the question of federal jurisdiction because the Refuse Act
appears to be aimed directly at the prevention of obstructions to
navigation. If the Refuse Act were interpreted to require that the
offending discharge constitute a hazard to navigation, then the extension of federal jurisdiction to non-navigable "tributaries" would
be tenable, at least, as related to recognized federal power over interstate commerce.
While some courts 7 have insisted that a discharge must be a
potential obstruction to navigation, the weight of modern authority is to the contrary. But if no obstruction to navigation is involved, then what is the basis of federal jurisdiction? And what
are its limits? One district court, while holding that no obstruction to navigation is necessary in order to find a discharge to be in
violation of the Refuse Act, has somewhat inconsistently held:
The Act itself applies only to navigable waters and their
tributaries, but those are the only waters that Congress has
power to regulate under the Commerce Clause.'8
Confusion and obscurity on the question of federal jurisdiction under the Refuse Act are not confined to lower courts. The United
States Supreme Court recently held, in United States v. Standard
[N]o action of the commission relating to policy or stream classification or standards shall be binding on any one of the signatory
bodies unless at least two of the commissioners from such signatory
body shall vote in favor thereof.
Id. at Art. I(D). (Each state appoints three members, and three members
at large are appointed by the President). Consequently, any state can
veto any significant action by the commission. But see Delaware River
Compact, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 815.101 (1967), a compact for the regulation of the Delaware River Basin to which Pennsylvania is a party, and
which includes pollution control. This Compact provides that Commission
action may be taken on majority vote. (Each state has one vote, as does
one commissioner at large appointed by the President). Id. at Art. II, § 2.5.
It is open to question whether the Pennsylvania legislature may cede authority over Pennsylvania land and water to an interstate commission, at
least without the veto power protection reserved in the Potomac River
Compact. See notes 22 and 23 and accompanying text infra.
16. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
17. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, whose courts have always
been watchful guardians of state sovereignty, is on record through its Supreme Court to the effect that to constitute a violation of the Refuse Act,
the discharge must pose a threat to navigation. In addition, where the
discharge is made into a tributary of a navigable river, the river must be
navigable at the point where it is joined by the tributary. Brush v. Lehigh
Valley Coal Co., 290 Pa. 322, 139 A. 860 (1918).
18. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354 (N.D.
Ind. 1970).
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Oil Co., that the discharge of oil was a violation of the Refuse Act
because the oil was a hazard to navigation. 19 But the Court went
on to say that the discharge violated the Refuse Act, both as a
menace to navigation and as a pollutant. The Court interpreted
the Refuse Act to prohibit discharges which were either obstructions or simply pollutants, 20 even though that interpretation was
not necessary to its finding of a violation.
The fact is that the United States Supreme Court has never
had the question of federal jurisdiction over non-navigable waters
presented to it squarely, at least in the context of pollution control. But the incipient tendency of federal jurisdiction to gain acceptance, as evidenced in the Standard Oil case, can be expected to
accelerate, especially if the Supreme Court continues to confuse
pollution and obstructions to navigation. Federal encroachment
in the pollution control field will continue, at least until the Supreme Court directly confronts the issue of federal jurisdiction
over non-navigable waters.
B. "General Welfare" Power.
It has been suggested that an alternative basis of federal authority in pollution control legislation to the concept of navigable
water is the power of the purse. 21 That is, Congress authorizes
the expenditure of vast sums for pollution control under its
broad (Article 1, § 8) power to provide for the general welfare.
Congress makes this money available to the states on the condition
that federal standards and regulations be accepted. The problem
of explicit constitutional authority over intrastate waters is sidestepped, and Congress accomplishes through spending that which it
could not, perhaps, accomplish through direct exercise of legislative power.
Notwithstanding the putative evasion of direct constitutional
confrontation through the device of giving away funds, it is questionable whether the states can, as a matter of general constitutional law, concede federal hegemony in return for money. By
allowing the federal authorities to set the standards and oversee
the administration of the anti-pollution programs, state legislatures
may be unlawfully delegating their legislative functions. In addi19. 384 U.S. 224, 226 (1966). The oil appears to have been discharged
into navigable waters.
20. Id. at 226-30. Since the Court apparently found as a matter of
fact that the oil discharged constituted a menace to navigation, references to
pollution control are obiter dicta.

21.

GRAD

at § 2-66.

tion, when a state permits the federal government to set water
quality standards for its citizens over non-navigable waters, the
state may have unlawfully bartered away part of its sovereign
power. It is well-established general law that a state legislature
may not delegate lawmaking power.2 2 It is an equally well-settled
that no state may voluntarily cede any part of its
general principle
23
sovereignty.
C. Summary and Conclusions.
Because of the traditional constitutional limitations which have
circumscribed federal authority over navigable waters, and because
of the dubiety of circumventing constitutional objections through
the device of "buying" federal authority through grants to states,
it is to be expected that some distinct, but not unrelated, constitutional basis will be asserted for the Act of 1972. One authority on
the Act, after discussing the meaning of the term "waters of the
United States," concludes:
Congress apparently intended to retain the connection
to the Commerce Clause, but eliminate 'navigability' as the
sole measure of that connection. Under this interpretation,
any connection of the water to the Commerce power would
suffice; then the Act could extend not only to 'navigable
waters of the United States' in the traditional sense, but
also to their tributaries, to interstate waters, to intrastate
waters which are utilized by interstate travelers for recreational or other purposes, to intrastate waters from which
fish or shellfish are taken for sale in interstate commerce,
and to intrastate waters utilized for
24 industrial purposes
by industries in interstate commerce.
In support of this position, the author cites case law upholding federal authority under the commerce clause to prohibit racial discrimination, 25 and case law supporting the proposition that the
commerce power may be exercised to exclude from interstate markets "goods produced under conditions inimical to the general welfare. '26 Whether these theories are broad enough to bring within
federal jurisdiction "all waters of the United States" remains to be
seen; certainly there are reasonable grounds for opposing views.
Indeed, recent cases have held explicitly that neither the United
States Constitution nor the Civil Rights Act confers or protects environnental rights.

27

22.
23.

See, e.g., 16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 133 (1956).
See, e.g., 81 C.J.S. States § 10 (1953).

24.

R. ZENEI, ThE FEDERAL LAW OF WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 17 (draft

especially prepared for ALI/ABA seminar, 1973) [hereinafter cited as
ZENER].
Mr. Zener is Associate General Counsel for Water, U.S.E.P.A.
Mr. Zener expects to publish this draft, subject to revisions, in book form.
The views he expressed are his own, and not necessarily those of E.P.A.
25. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1966).
26. Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219,236 (1948).
27. See, e.g., Tanner v.Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex.
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At the bottom of the view that congressional power to control
pollution does extend to all the waters of the United States appears
to be the fundamental proposition that since pollution of the environment is a national problem, there must exist national authority to cope with it.28 Doubtless proponents of federal authority will emphasize the particularly apt "nexus" to interstate commerce represented by a river system if the issue of federal jurisdiction is ever litigated, but it is felt that weighty arguments can
be raised in opposition. Whether the issue is ever litigated will depend upon practical considerations, such as whether the Act is in
fact applied to discharges into non-navigable waters. It would appear, however, that the issue of federal jurisdiction should be raised,
if at all, before the national government gains uncontested constitutional respectability for its broad assertion of power by default. In the event of challenge, it is suggested that the discussion
above might form a broad outline of objections to federal jurisdiction under the Act.
H.

A.

STANDARDS, CERTIFICATIONS AND PERMITS

Standards.

The Act of 1972 attacks the problem of water pollution by providing two sets of criteria: effluent discharge limitations and
water quality standards. 29 Discharge limitations focus upon the
technology used at the source of the pollution to control and reduce
it. Water quality standards deal more generally with the result to
be achieved, but of course, water quality is a two-way street which
may lead back to discharge limitations if individual discharge limitations fail to achieve desired water quality. The Act's provisions
1972). See also Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,
Inc., 13 Adams L.J. 45 (Pa. C.P. 1971); Flowers v. Municipal Authority, 57
Pa. D. & C.2d 274 (C.P. Bucks 1972). (The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may confer environmental rights, however). From
these cases it could be inferred, or at least argued, that the same "nexus"
between an activity and interstate commerce sufficient to support federal
authority in the civil rights area is not eo ipso sufficient to support federal
jurisdiction over environmental matters.
28. See, e.g., ZFNE, supra note 24, at 18.
29. Zener observes:
Water quality standards--which were the only standards provided for in the FWPCA prior to 1972-were based on the view
that waste disposal is an acceptable use to make of a body of
water, so long as it does not interfere with other desired uses. On
the other hand, effluent standards are generally based on the view
that all pollution is undesirable and should be reduced to the
maximum extent that technology will permit.
ZENER at 22.

and their probable interaction will be outlined from the standpoint
of both approaches.
(1)

Effluent discharge limitations.

The Act goes about the imposition of effluent discharge limitations by distinguishing between point sources and non-point
sources of pollution,30 between existing sources and new sources of
pollution, between toxic and non-toxic effluents, between public
and private sources, and, to some extent, between thermal discharges and other discharges. Point sources have been dealt with
in detail by the Act and will be discussed below. Non-point source
discharges will be the subject of EPA regulation over the next year
through the issuance of guidelines and information for the control
of non-point-source discharges. 31
Existing sources. Section 301 of the Act prescribes discharge
limitations for existing private-point sources of pollution.3 2 Section 301 states the requirements for discharge limitations in terms
of compliance with "the best practicable control technology currently available" by 1977, and with the "best available technology
economically achievable" by 1983. The basic difference between
the 1977 and the 1983 requirements is that the 1977 requirement refers to treatment at the "end of the pipe," whereas the 1983 technology refers to the entire manufacturing process of the plant.3
30. "Point source" of pollution is defined in § 502 (4) as "any discernable, confined and discrete conveyance" of a pollutant, including a "discrete
fissure." A point source is contrasted to a non-point source, not directly
defined in the Act. However, § 304(e) clearly indicates such sources as
run-off from fields, mines, construction sites, etc., seepage of various sorts,
and other sources not resulting in "discrete fissures" through which the
pollutants flow to be non-point sources.
31. See § 304(e). When non-point-source pollution adds to pointsource pollution, and the total effect violates water quality standards, pointsources may well face more stringent controls. See § 303.
32. "Existing source" is not defined directly in the Act. But there are
only two categories of sources: "new" and "existing." New sources are defined directly (see note 48 infra), so that existing sources, therefore, become
all "non-new" sources. It should also be noted that § 502 defines pollutants
to include heat, making thermal pollution generally subject to § 301. But
other sections of the Act significantly qualify § 301's application to thermal
pollution. See text accompanying notes 55-56 infra.
33. The terms "best practicable control technology," "currently available," and "best available technology economically achievable" are not
defined in the Act. The House Report does discuss them, however:
By the term "control technology" the Committee means the treatment facilities at the end of a manufacturing, agricultural, or other
process rather than control technology within the manufacturing
process itself.

By the term "best practicable" the Committee means that all
factors set forth in § 304(b) (1) (B) be taken into consideration.
The determination of the best practicable control technology currently available is not to be governed by the existing quality of
the receiving waters. [§ 304(b) (1) (B) factors are set forth in the
text immediately below].
By the term "currently available," the Committee means a control
technology, which, by demonstrated projects, pilot plants, and gen-
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(Section 301 states the requirement for public treatment works
somewhat differently and, perhaps, less stringently. These standards will be touched on briefly below). EPA is required by Section 301 to translate these generalities into more concrete discharge
limitations through the issuance of regulations under Section 304
within the next year. The Section 304(b) guidelines will:
(1) (A) identify, in terms of amounts of constituents and
chemical, physical, and biological characteristics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reduction attainable through
the application of the best practicable control technology
currently available for classes and categories of point
sources...
(B) specify factors to be taken into account in determining the control measures and practices to be appliacable to point sources. .

.

. Factors . . . shall include [for

the 1977 requirement: total cost in relation to benefit, age
of equipment and facilities, the process used, engineering
problems, "process changes," and other matters such as energy requirements and non-water environmental impact].
(2)(A) identify, in terms of amounts of constituents and
chemical, physical, and biological characteristics of pollutants, the degree of effluent reductions attainable through
the application of the best control measures and practices
achievable ...
eral use, has demonstrated a reasonable level of engineering and
economic confidence in the viability of the process at the time of
commencement of actual construction of the control facilities.
By the term "best available demonstrated technology," the Committee means those plant processes and control technology, which,
at the pilot plant, semiworks, or other level, has demonstrated both
technological performance and economic viability at a level sufficient to reasonably justify the making of investments in such new
facilities...
H.R. 92-911 at 101-03. The Report constrasts the 1977 and 1983 standards:
When the term "best available demonstrated technology" is used,
the Committee intends that this shall apply to the totality of the
point source and the plant processes behind the point source. By
this, it is meant in contrast to the term "best practicable control
technology currently available," that the total plant is being considered and that "best available demonstrated technology does not
apply solely to the control techniques used at the actual discharge
of the point source. This is a basic difference between the best
available demonstrated technology in the . . . 198[3] requirement
and the best practicable control technology currently available in
the 197[7] requirement.
Id. at 102-03. One authority contests the distinction made in the House
Report between "end-of-pipe" and "in-plant" control of pollution, basing
his argument on the fact that the language cited above was omitted from
the conference report, and upon the fact that under § 304 (discussed in
text infra), EPA must specify 'measure and practices' which will comply
with both 1977 and 1983 limitations. ZENER at 46 n.42. The language of
the House Report appears to be more consistent with the Act read as a
whole, however.

(B) specify factors to be taken into account in determining the best measures and practices available to comply
with [the 1983 requirements. The factors are basically the
same as those listed above for the 1977 requirements].
84

(3) identify control measures and practices available to
eliminate the discharge of pollutants from categories and
classes of point sources, taking into account the cost of
achieving such elimination of the discharge of pollutants.
While Section 304 guidelines will assist dischargers of effluents in
translating the general requirements into engineering plans and
physical equipment, the ultimate responsibility for meeting the discharge limitations remains with the discharger. EPA does not, apparently, contemplate publication or approval of technical plans
or equipment for specific sites or projects."3 Consequently, Section
304 data may be something less than a revelation when scrutinized
by those faced with the necessity of compliance with discharge
limitations. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that, as a
practical matter, EPA may find itself in the business of actually
prescribing specific technologies, because under Section 304 EPA
must describe some applicable technology which will meet effluent
discharge limitations. The result is likely to be widespread adoption, as a matter of self-protection, of the technology described by
EPA (especially if there is any danger that alternatives may not
achieve the proper degree of effluent elimination).36 The possibility of government-dictated technology may become particularly
7
acute in the case of a new source.
The extent to which effluent discharge limitations will operate
uniformly over all facilities within a given industry will depend
largely upon how EPA categorizes and subcategorizes within the
industry. While uniformity is a goal of the Act, practical considerations will no doubt require that flexibility to meet individual
plant characteristics be introduced at some point in the process of
issuing regulations and permits. 38 The problem of where and
how to make allowares for individal differences is likely to prove
irksome.
Section 301 permits EPA to meliorate the 1983 requirements
for a given point source to some extent if it appears that the
owner/operator is spending as much as he can afford while moving reasonably toward full compliance. It has been suggested that
because a cost-benefit factor is included in the Section 304 list of
factors to be considered in setting 1977 limitations, whereas it has
34. Reference to cost-benefit is omitted with regard to the 1983 factors.

But see note 38 and accompanying text infra.
35. See S. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as S.R. 92-1236].
36. ZENER at 45.
37. See note 50 and accompanying text infra.
38. ZFNER at 36-39. See text accompanying notes 73-87 infra.
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been omitted from the 1983 list, cost-benefit analysis has no place
in EPA decisons on 1983 limitations, except as provided for in Section 301.,1
But the practical importance of the differences between Section 301 and Section 304 in regard to cost considerations
is at best argumentative; the truth seems to be that reference to
legislative history for clarification will reveal only that the House
and the Senate could never agree on the role that cost-benefit
should play in setting discharge limitations, 40 with the result that
no reliable conclusions can be drawn on the issue at this time.
An instance of the interplay of effluent limitations and water
quality standards is found in another important provision of Section 301 which states that, notwithstanding the 1977 discharge limitations ("best practicable control technology currently available,"
discussed above), dischargers may be required to meet more stringent discharge limitations,
including those necessary to meet water quality standards,
treatment standards, or schedules of compliance, established pursuant to any State law or regulations. . . or any
other Federal law or regulation, or required to implement
any applicable
water quality standard established pursuant
41
to this Act.

Section 302 contains the same provision for the imposition of more
stringent effluent discharge limitations than those generally required for 1983 ("best available technology economically achievable," discussed above), where the total pollutant control effect fails
to achieve desired water quality. Notice and hearing are required
under Section 302, and those to be taxed with the more stringent
standards will have the opportunity to defeat them if it can be
shown that the costs are unreasonable compared to the benefits.
39. ZENFi at 27-35.
40. Id. Zener argues that if cost considerations are allowed to enter
decision-making, there will be too much room for states to grant Section 301
"variances" under their permit programs (discussed below). If states do
so act, the argument runs, the Act will be frustrated by states competing
for industrial installations attracted with the promise of variances. However, there is support for the assertion that, at least in the energy generation industry, cost-benefit should be a factor in setting discharge limitations, especially since facilities for power production are not generally in
position to "shop" for different locations. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. H9129-30
(daily ed., Oct. 4, 1972).
41. With regard to "other" federal agencies, this provision appears to
conflict with § 511 (c) (discussed in text infra), but the conflict is only apparent. Informal discussion with EPA officials reveals that, according to
EPA interpretation at least, § 301 is merely the conduit from other federal
agencies to EPA for information and suggestions for more stringent standards; EPA retains the final power of approval. A reading of the Act as a
whole supports this view, because it is clearly the intent of the Act to give
EPA plenary power over water quality and effluent discharge limitations.

A problem surrounding the setting of technological standards
which will achieve discharge limitations for existing sources (and
for new sources, discussed immediately below, as well) is, what degree of demonstrated success should be required before technologies are adopted under Section 304 (or Section 306 in the case of
new sources) ? The legislative history of the Act of 1972 generally
refers to demonstrated efficacy at the pilot plant, demonstration
project, or semi-works level,4 2 but there are also references to the
desirability of relying upon a history of routine industry use
wherever possible. 43 EPA has already been taken to court over
the setting of emission control standards under the Clean Air Act
on the contention that standards were set without sufficient evidence

of their efficacy. 4 4

One authority who has analyzed the

problem thoroughly has concluded that while there will be a "natural tendency" for EPA to rely upon experience based upon routine use, it will "have to take some risks" in prescribing new tech45
nology.
New sources. Section 306 requires EPA to publish within 19
months from enactment of the Act of 197246 national standards of
performance, by industry type, for all new 4 7 sources of pollution in
27 industrial categories. 41 Standards of performance are to reflect
the greatest degree of effluent reduction achievable through application of the best available demonstrated control technology,
processes, operating methods, or other alternatives, including, where
49
It
practicable, a standard permitting no discharge of pollutants.
42. See H.R. 92-911 at 103; S. REP. NO. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 58
(1972) [hereinafter cited as S.R. 92-414]. See also 118 CONG. REc. H9117
(daily ed., Oct. 4, 1972).
43. See 118 CONG. REC. S16873 (daily ed., Oct. 4, 1972).
44. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, Civil No. 72-1079 (D.C. Cir. April,
1973).
45. ZENER at 43.
46. October 18, 1972.
47. A "new source" is defined as any source, the construction of
which is commenced after the publication of proposed regulations prescribing a standard of performance under § 306 if that standard becomes final.
48. The 27 categories are: pulp and paper mills; paperboard, builders
paper and board mills; meat product and rendering processing; dairy product processing, grain mills; canned and preserved fruits and vegetables
processing; canned and preserved seafood processing; sugar processing; textile mills; cement manufacturing; feedlots; electroplating; organic chemicals
manufacturing; inorganic chemicals manufacturing; plastic and synthetic
materials manufacturing; soap and detergent manufacturing; fertilizer manufacturing; petroleum refining; iron and steel manufacturing; non-ferrous
metals manufacturing; phosphate manufacturing; steam electric powerplants; ferroalloy manufacturing; leather tanning and finishing; glass and
asbestos manufacturing; rubber processing; and timber products processing.
49. The House committee report states:
It will be sufficient for the purposes of setting the level of control
under available technology, that there be one operating facility
which demonstrates that the level can be achieved or that there is
sufficient information and data from a relevant pilot plant or semiworks plant to provide the needed economic and technical justification for such a new source.
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has been asserted that because EPA has greater power to prescribe
technologies necessary to meet § 306 discharge limitations for new
sources as compared to its power over existing sources, the prospect
of "an unprecedented intrusion of government into private industrial technology" looms larger in the case of new sources. 0
Section 306 covers sources generally, not merely point sources.
The EPA industry standards for new sources are to take into consideration the costs of required effluent reduction, as well as energy requirements and non-water-related environmental impact.
Once a new point source is constructed to meet the current industry standard of performance, more stringent criteria may not be
enforced against the point source for a period of ten years after
completion unless accelerated depreciation is taken, in which
case the shorter amortization period applies. This protection will
not extend to toxic discharge limitations (§ 307, discussed below),
and it may not extend to more stringent water-quality based limitations (§ 303, discussed below). Modifications to a plant construction in compliance with Section 306 are not, apparently, to
be considered additional "new sources" subjecting the entire facility to standards promulgated subsequent to construction, although the additional or modified discharges themselves will be
subject to prevailing discharge limitations through permit regulation (Section 402, discussed below).51
Toxic512 effluent discharge limitations applying to all sources
(new and existing) are separately provided for in Section 307.
EPA will promulgate effluent standards for toxic discharges within
six months. An authority on the Act of 1972 has concluded, after
reviewing the legislative history of § 307, that the "ambient effect"
approach to toxic discharges was intended by Congress. I.e., discharge limitations may vary according to ambient differences, as
opposed to having EPA set national discharge limitations for cateH.R. 92-911 at 111. See discussion at notes 42-44 and accompanying text
supra.
50. ZENER at 46. The greater degree of government influence over
new source technology is asserted to arise from the practical distinction
between existing sources, where pollution control technology must accept
certain fixed limitations, and new sources, where there are no constraints
resulting from a fixed installation.
51. See H.R. REP. No. 92-1465, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 128-29 (1972) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 92-1465]. See also 118 CoNG. REc. H9128 (daily ed.,
Oct. 4, 1972).
52. "Toxic" pollutants are defined in the Act as those which will
cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations,
physiological malfunctions or physical deformations upon exposure, injection, inhalation or assimilation directly ar indirectly with any organism.

gories of sources (under §§ 301, 304 and 306, for example) . 5 It
is unclear what the appropriate criteria of difference are, but one
consideration which, it is asserted, should not play a part is the
cost of eliminating toxic discharges, at least short
of the social and
4
economic consequences from plant shut-downs.1
Section 307 also makes provision for the prohibition of discharges into public treatment works of pollutants which cannot
be treated by the public works or which are incompatible or interfere with the public works. (Section 307 applies to both new and
existing sources). Within six months, EPA is to publish pretreatment standards which will determine the degree of pretreatment necessary. Section 307 specifically extends to discharges
from what would otherwise be a "new source" under Section 306.
Prior to promulgation of the pretreatment standards by EPA and
without knowledge of the specific nature of the effluent discharge
from a particular source, it is impossible to determine whether discharge into a public system under Section 307 might provide a
path of least resistance in relation to the Section 306 standard.
(The effect upon industry of the public treatment works provisions
of the Act is discussed in Part IV of this paper).
Thermal pollution. Heat is one of the pollutants included under Section 301, so that thermal pollution appears to be treated
like any other pollutant." But other sections of the Act also reach
the thermal pollution problem, and qualify the general approach
of Section 301. Section 316 starts off by providing that a source of
thermal pollution may be relieved of Section 301 (existing) or
Section 306 (new) discharge limitations to the extent that the
owner/operator can demonstrate that the general limitations of
these sections are unnecessarily stringent for the preservation of
the fish and wildlife in and on the body of water affected. At the
same time, Section 303 provides for ;the identification of waters
where more stringent thermal discharge limitations may be necessary. Acceptable heat loads are to be estimated for the receiving
waters identified.
While it is not clear from the Act itself, it appears that the
water-quality approach (as opposed to discharge limitations) to
thermal pollution was meant to be emphasized by the Act of
1972.56 Given the differences between thermal and non-thermal
pollution, and the importance of considering the characteristics of
ZENER at 46-52.
54. Id.
55. See note 32 supra.
56. See, e.g., 118 CoNG. REC. H9129-30 (daily ed., Oct. 4, 1972). Accord,
ZENER at 52-58. Zener concludes:
The law as enacted was a compromise, under which the technologybased standard is taken as the base, subject to being made less
stringent on a showing that a lesser degree of environmental protection is adequate.
Id. at 55.
53.
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the receiving water in the case of the former, as well as the relative
costliness and immobility of nuclear facilities, it does seem logical
that water quality standards rather than discharge limitations
should preponderate in thermal discharge questions.
Section 316 also contains a special provision for regulation of
cooling water intake structures, which states that they must reflect
the "best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact," without regard to timetables of Section 301. This
paragraph of Section 316 applies to both new and existing point
sources.
Section 316 concludes by extending protection for ten years (or
shorter amortization period under the Internal Revenue Code if
applicable) to all point sources of thermal pollution built or modified to conform to either Section 301 or Section 303 as applicable.
(2)

57
Water quality standards.

The emphasis of the Act appears to be upon effluent discharge
limitations. However, certain previously identified sections of the
Act attack the pollution problem from -the water quality side.
Sub-section 301(b) (1) (C), for example, allows states to impose
stricter discharge limitations than those imposed generally by Section 301 for 1977 if they are necessary to meet state water quality
standards, etc. Section 302 gives EPA the same general power to
require more stringent limitations than those generally established
by the 1983 limitations. In both cases, it is water quality which
may lead back to stricter discharge limitations. In addition, the
Act adopts a general water quality approach to thermal pollution
as discussed above. Section 304 requires EPA to publish, within
one year, criteria for water quality and many other data bearing
on the identification, analysis, load limits, etc., of pollutants. Section 305 provides for a comprehensive "water quality inventory"
to be taken during 1973 which will show which waters are of unsatisfactory quality and recommendations for improvement.
Section 303 of the Act is the principal water quality section,
and it provides in elaborate detail how water quality standards are
57. ZxsiR at 58-64 contains an excellent summary of water quality
law prior to the Act of 1972. The principal defect of the old water quality
laws appears to have been that they were rarely translated (or translatable) into enforceable discharge limitations (a prominent exception being,
apparently, the regulations issued by the Delaware River Basin Commission,
note 15 supra). Furthermore, the federal non-degradation policy (preservation of water quality in waters exceeding stated standards) was not
being enforced.

to be adopted. Reducing the intricate framework 8 of federal-state
interplay to its one essential feature, it is this: EPA will set or approve all water quality standards for all state waters over the next
year and a half. Meanwhile, all existing state water quality standards remain in effect until and unless disapproved by EPA. The
legislative history of Section 303 makes it clear that "water quality
standards will be utilized for the purpose of setting effluent limitations in those cases where effluent limitations for point sources
would not be consistent with such standards." 9 That is, where
point source standards do not accomplish the desired water quality
because the total effect of all sources is too great, more stringent
effluent limitations can be imposed. Non-point-sources may also
produce a total effect which renders point source limitations unacceptable.
Section 303 provides for basin planning, and for the identification of waters for which the 1977, discharge limitations will not be
sufficient to achieve desired water quality. Next, the states must,
subject to federal approval, allocate maximum discharge limitations to all sources affecting the identified body of water.
An aspect of water-quality regulation which has great potential importance is the provision found in many state water-quality
laws prohibiting degradation of waters which currently exceed
water quality standards.60 EPA has left these non-degradation
provisions of state law intact, and they are enforceable under § 301
(b) (1) (C) (stricter limitations necessary to meet state water quality standards, discussed above). Generally speaking, applicants
who seek permission to degrade waters currently exceeding water
quality criteria will have to show that the project sought to be approved is socially or economically necessary, and that the best
available control technology will be used to limit discharges6 1
Non-degradation standards have so far been upheld under the
Clean Air Act, which does not preserve as explicitly as the Act of
62
1972 existing state standards.
There is an apparent loose end in the water quality scheme of
the Act, which is probably more apparent than real. Section 510
of the Act specifically reserves to the states the power to prescribe
more rigid discharge limitations or "other" limitations. Section
301(b) (1) (C) (discussed above) requires dischargers to meet more
stringent limitations necessary for compliance with state water
quality or treatment standards. These provisions in favor of state
58. This includes provisions for periodic reviews of standards and
public hearings.
59. T.R. 92-911 at 105. See also 118 CONG. REC. H9123 (daily ed. Oct.
4, 1972).
60. ZENsE at 69-73.
61. Id. at 70.
62. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The

decision affirming the district court's opinion is on appeal.
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water-quality-based discharge limitations appear to conflict with
the provisions of §303 which give EPA the power to disapprove water quality standards inconsistent with the Act. If this apparent
dilemma is resolved by an interpretation which gives EPA the
power to insist upon minimum standards, with the states left free
to impose more stringent conditions (an interpretation asserted to
be consistent with the plain language of §§ 510 and 301(b) (1) (C)),
then the states retain an effective "veto" power over any EPAissued discharge permit under § 403 (see immediately below).
B. Certificationsand permits.
State certifications-Section401. The primary means of insuring compliance with discharge limitations is the issuance of a permit to discharge which will set forth the specific discharge limitations for the applicant. These permits will be issued by the states
or by EPA, under circumstances discussed below. Section 401 provides that before any federal license or permit can be issued by
any federal agency, the applicant must secure confirmation from
the situs state that the proposed discharge will conform to the discharge limitations of the Act (Sections 301, 302, 306 and 307 discussed above). Since Sections 301 and 302 include water quality
standards, and since Section 510 generally reserves to states the
power to impose "other limitations" necessary to protect water
quality, the state certifying agency may require compliance with
state water quality standards, as well as EPA-issued effluent limitations, before granting its 401 certification. Section 401(b) specifically reserves to "any department or other agency pursuant to
any other provision of law to require compliance with any applicable water quality requirement." State agencies appear to be comprehended by this language.63 If no discharge limitations or pretreatment standards have been promulgated via Section 304 for
Sections 301 or 307, and if no national standard of performance
(for new sources) has been promulgated under Section 306, and if
no water-quality-related limitation has been set under Section 302
(all discussed above), and if no state water quality standard applies, then the state shall so certify. In this event, perhaps unlikely, the federal licensing agency from whom a permit is sought
is apparently required to make its own determinations of the proposed project's effects on water quality. 64 As will be seen below,
63. Cf. note 41 supra.
64. A federal agency which finds itself in this position will apparently
be required to perform those water-quality analyses set forth in Calvert

EPA will retain the final word on any water-quality determination
made by another federal agency through its plenary power to issue
Section 402 permits. (The responsibilities of federal agencies under the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 have been
altered by the Act of 1972, and the changes will be discussed below). Notice and, to some extent, public hearings are required for

Section 401 certifications.
If no state agency exists or has the authority to issue Section
401 certifications, the applicants apply directly to EPA. If a state
fails to act on a Section 401 application within a reasonable time
(not to exceed one year), then the certificate requirement is
waived for the purpose of obtaining a federal license or permit under Section 402. Denial of a Section 401 application by a state is
apparently to be contested in state courts.65 A Section 401 certification shall state the discharge limitations, monitoring requirements, and "other limitations" upon which issuance is conditioned.
Where permits are sought from other federal agencies (such as
the AEC) both for construction and operation of a facility, a Section 401 certification will cover both the construction and operation applications unless the situs state objects because of intervening changes in regulations or conditions. Owners/operators must
keep state agencies informed of proposed changes in order to be
protected under this provision. Where no federal operating license
is required, the applicant must allow the state opportunity to review the proposed operation for compliance with the Act.
No federal license or permit can be issued without a Section
401 certificate, but all present projects, the construction of which
commenced prior to April 3, 1970, may continue to operate under
existing license (e.g., issued under Section 21(b) of the previous
Act of 1948, as amended,"' or under state licenses or other federal
permits) without a Section 401 permit until April 3, 1973, when
67
existing licenses not issued with a Section 401 permit expire.
The state certification required by Section 401 may be obviated
once the state becomes qualified to administer its own discharge
permit program under Section 402.
Perhaps the most significant fact about § 401 is that it appears
to give the states a "veto" power over the issuance of discharge
permits (i.e., where EPA is itself the issuing authority).6S A state
may apparently refuse to issue a certificate even though the appliCliff's Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971)

(See Part V infra).

65. H.R. 92-911 at 122.
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (1967).
67. Section 401 is substantially Section 21(b) of the Act of 1948 as
amended, but rewritten to conform to the requirements of the Act of 1972.
H.R. 92-911 at 121.
68. ZENE at 91. The circumstances under which EPA will yield its
permit-issuing authority to the states are discussed below.
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cant proposes to comply with EPA-promulgated limitations, because the states are reserved the power, under §§ 510 and 301(b)
(1) (C), to impose more stringent limitations based upon waterquality standards.6 9 Although this is the interpretation placed
upon the law by some eminent authorities,7 0 there may be arguments to the contrary. 71 This asserted state "veto" may, it is
claimed, be enforced either through the denial of a certificate
(thus preventing the issuance of a permit), or through attaching
the (more stringent) conditions to the certificate.
Permits-Section 402. Section 402 provides for the issuance of
permits to discharge effluents into the nation's waters upon the
condition that the discharge will comply with the applicable discharge limitations, water quality standards, and monitoring and
reporting requirements (discussed below) of the Act. The permit
will state the discharge limitations with which the applicant must
comply. To some extent the state certification and the state/EPA
discharge permits overlap, and in fact the two-tier system is designed as a double-check operation. It must be remembered that
no discharge may take place without a Section 402 permit, and that
the permit is conditioned upon the state certification (where applicable and where not waived, as noted above). The two-step
procedure may reduce to one step (Section 402 permit) as soon as
the situs state qualifies to administer its own Section 401 program.
States are expected to assume the primary responsibility for issuance of Section 402 permits,72 but until they qualify under
69. See text preceding note 63 supra.
70. See note 68 supra.
71. For example: Section 510 does not mention water quality standards, although it employs nearly every other conceivable terminology,
while § 301 (b) (1) (C) seems to be directed at the 1977 discharge limitations,
rather than at the 1983 limitations or new source standards. The legislative
history of § 510 reveals no greater precision of language than that of the
Act itself. Section 303, dealing specifically with water quality standards,
gives EPA the power to disapprove any such standard "not consistent" or
"inconsistent" with the Act (there is no reference in § 303 to minimum
standards and powers reserved to the states, except that states may require
compliance with applicable provisions of the Act before the 1977 and 1983
cut-off dates. § 303 (f)). Furthermore, it seems equally consistent with
both the language of § 510 (which speaks of "limitations" and "effluent
standards," rather than water quality standards), and the language of § 302
(which refers to the 1983 discharge limitations), to interpret the powers
reserved to the states as confined to those situations in which the total
effect of individual permits is to increase pollution beyond the waterquality-based limits approved by EPA under § 303. If the latter interpretation is correct, the asserted "veto" power of the states under § 401 would
be much less drastic than it would be if states could set more stringent
limitations in every case.
72. Section 304 (h) of the Act provides that no state permit board can

the provisions of the Act, EPA will approve Section 402 applications. And even after states have qualified to issue their own
Section 402 permits, EPA retains the power to veto any permit
which it finds does not comply with the Act. Interim authority
to issue Section 402 permits has been granted to certain qualified
78
states.
During the time it takes EPA to promulgate specific discharge
limitations and technologies pursuant to § 304 (translation of
the general 1977 and 1983 standards into more specific technological terms), EPA will issue Section 402 permits under the general
grant of permit authority contained in § 402 (a). Section 402 (a)
requires an opportunity for public hearing, a requirement which
EPA has interpreted to mean public notice with opportunity for
comment. 4 It has been observed that these early permits will
have a natural tendency to set the mark for later discharge limitations promulgated under § 304, because of the inequity which
would result between permit holders and applicants if later limita75
tions were more stringent.
Compliance with the terms of a Section 402 discharge permit
(the life of which is to be a maximum of five years) is deemed to
be compliance with the discharge limitations and water quality
standards of the Act. 76 But § 402(b) (1) qualifies the protection
against prosecution for the five-year period by providing that permits may be terminated when there occurs a "change in any condiinclude as a member anyone who:
receives, or has during the previous two years received, a significant
portion of his income directly or indirectly from permit holders or
applicants for a permit.
73. Section 402 (b) (8), Act of 1972. The House committee report states
that most enforcement actions should originate with the states. H.R. 92-911
at 115. Proposed forms and regulations for § 402 have been issued, and
will soon become final. 37 Fed. Reg. 25898 (1972). Regulations setting
forth the conditions for approval of state permit programs were promulgated December 22, 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 28390 (1972). As of that date
California, Iowa, Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio,
Oregon and Washington had received interim authority to issue permits until
March 18, 1973, on which date EPA will resume its § 402 authority until the
states qualify for final authority under the new regulations.
74.

ZENER at

84.

75. Id. Environmentalists appear to be gearing up for an attack on
the wide-spread issuance of pre-§ 304 limitations. Their position seems to
be that such early permits should be kept to a minimum in order to avoid
the "natural tendency" (referred to in the text above), which, they claim,
puts the cart before the horse. In addition, the environmentalists contend
that it is much more difficult to monitor many individual applications then
it is to monitor one large proceeding to establish national standards.
7. Section 402 (k) of the Act seems to make an exception tot his rule of
deemed compliance in the case of toxic discharges under § 307. But there
are indications that the exception is only apparent; the exceptions were
written in to cover cases in which discharges are made under a § 402 permit
before toxic discharge standards have been set under § 307. Once § 307
standards have been promulgated, and a discharge under a § 402 permit is
in accordance with the § 307 limitations, then § 402 (k) will protect the
discharger from prosecution under § 307.
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tion that requires either a temporary or permanent reduction or
elimination of the permitted discharge. '77 One authority has commented that unless this language is narrowly78 construed, the protection of the five-year permit will be illusory.
All existing permits issued under Section 13 of the Refuse
Act7" are recognized as valid. After the effective date of the Act
(October 18, 1972) applications are not to be made under the Refuse
Act; instead, the applications are to be made under Section 402 of
the Act of 1972. Except for the issuance of Section 402 permits, the
Refuse Act has not been repealed.80 Section 402 procedures and
permits will include applications to discharge sewage sludge under
Section 405, but discharges of dredged or fill material will continue
to require the approval of the Secretary of the Army under Section 404, subject to EPA scrutiny and veto. Unlike the Refuse Act,
the Act of 1972 does not exempt municipal waste treatment works8l
from the Section 402 permit requirement.
Section 402(k) contains an important provision that no violation of Section 402 (or of Sections 301 or 306) will result from a
presently ongoing discharge where a permit has been applied for
under Section 402 but no final decision has been rendered. (It
should be remembered that applications under Section 13 of the
Refuse Act are considered applications under Section 402). This
reprieve ends December 31, 1974, and is subject to the exception of
permit applications which have not been acted upon because the
applicant has not furnished information "reasonably required or
requested" to process the applications. s 2 Persons presently discharging effluents who were not required to obtain a permit under
Section 13 of the Refuse Act should apply for a permit under Section 402 before April 16, 1973, to be covered by the terms of the
section. The protection of § 402(k) does not extend to violations
of § 302 (water quality limitations imposed by EPA where the
1983 limitations are insufficient) or to violations of § 307 (toxic
77. This qualification applies whether the permit was issued by the
state or by EPA. See § 402(a) (3).
78. ZENER at 88-89. Zener suggests that the language should be read in
favor of additional discharge limitations only in those situations where
conditions have changed in the receiving body of water, and should not be
read to include changes in EPA-promulgated discharge limitations.
79. 33 U.S.C. 407 (1967).
80. See 118 CONG. REC. H9126 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972).
81. See H.R. 92-911 at 125, 128.
82. The reprieve was necessary because of the great backlog of applications under the old Refuse Act Section 13, and because the states are
expected to administer Section 402, problems which require time for solution. See 118 CONG. REc. H9133 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972).

pollutants). But it has been suggested that even in such cases of
asserted violation not covered by the protection of § 402(k), the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction would authorize a court to stay
proceedings pending administrative disposition of a discharger's
permit application, unless the discharge contained toxics requiring
expeditious judicial action. 8
While Section 402 will reprieve some potential violators of
the Act of 1972, Section 4 of the Act will not aid those already
being proceeded against under the prior Federal Water Pollution
Control Act in effect on October 18, 1972, such proceedings "lawfully commenced... in relation to the discharge of ... duties under the prior act shall not abate."
Once a state has qualified under § 402 to administer its own
permit program,84 EPA retains the power under § 402(d) to veto
any state-issued permit "outside the guidelines and requirements"
of the Act.82 In order to promote "efficient program management," EPA is required under § 402 (f) to waive its veto power for
small dischargers, 8 and EPA may waive its veto power in other
cases. In addition to vetoing state permits, EPA may also revoke
state permit power under § 402(c), a drastic measure considered
unlikely.s7 Finally, EPA retains some enforcement authority under § 307 (as explainted in Part III (B), below).
III.

A.

INSPECTIONS, REPORTS AND ENFORCEMENT

Inspections,Monitoring and Entry.

Section 308 of the Act requires that owners or operators of
point sources of pollution shall monitor their discharges and keep
records and reports of the results as required by either state or
EPA regulations. In addition, EPA (or the state) is authorized
to inspect books, equipment, etc., to determine whether or not the
Act is being violated. EPA has also been given the power to require monitoring and recordkeeping in support of its program to
develop effluent limitation standards. While the Act is not at all
clear on the point, the legislative history of the Act states that
EPA's right of entry and inspection applies only to its enforcement
83. ZENER at 89-90. Zener goes on to comment:
Under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the courts may stay proceedings where the question at issue is also before an administrative agency with relevant expertise.
This would appear to fit the case of a pending discharge permit application.
84. Details are omitted,
85. If, as contended by some authorities (see note 71 and accompanying text supra), the states can veto EPA action and EPA can veto state
action, then the applicant is really faced with two "final" authorities with
power over his permit application. In the face of the difficulties presented
by this prospect, it is suggested that the assertion of a broad "veto" power
by the states may be unwarranted (see note 71 supra).
86. See S.R. 92-414 at 71.

87. ZENER at 95-96.
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role, and does not apply to its data collection functions. 88 Information submitted under Section 308 of the Act is public, subject
to the trade secrets exception.8 9 States may develop their own
system for administering the provisions of Section 308, and if EPA
approves, state administration will supplant federal administration. 90

B. Enforcement, Sanctions, Administrative and Judicial Procedure.
Provisions for the enforcement of the Act of 1972 are contained
in Section 309. Enforcement of the Act may be by state or by federal authorities. Enforcement basically entails the policing of the
effluent discharge limitations and water quality standards contained in Sections 301, 302, 306 and 307, and the monitoring and reporting requirements contained in Section 308. Procedurally, a
violation of the Act occurs whenever there has been a discharge of
pollutants in violation of the permit section (Section 402). To the
extent that the states qualify to administer their own permit programs, the states will move "to abate violations of the permit or
the permit program, including civil and criminal penalties. ... "
Where states fail to act, EPA can move in to prosecute violations under Section 309 after following detailed procedures for
"notifying" all parties of their intentions and taking other prescribed steps. EPA enforcement may take the form of a compliance order (with a maximum of 30 days in which to comply),," or
a civil action in the appropriate United States district court. In
addition, criminal penalties of up to $25,000 per day of violation,
and prison terms of up to one year are authorized for willful or
negligent violations. Under Section 510, the states are expressly
reserved the right to prosecute violators of state effluent limitations or other limitations and prohibitions outside the Act of 1972,
as long as the limitations or prohibitions are not less stringent than
those established in the Act.9 2 And under Section 511 (a), federal
88. H.R. 92-911 at 114. According to the Conference Report, the monitoring requirements of § 308 will apply to those who discharge into municipal treatment works, as well as to those who discharge directly into waterways. H.R. 92-1236 at 130.
89. Effluent data are not trade secrets. § 308(b).
90. State enforcement programs approved by EPA are one of the
requirements for state-administered permit programs under § 402.
91. Orders to comply with Section 308 (monitoring, reports, etc.)
cannot take effect until the alleged violator "has had an opportunity to
confer" with EPA.
92. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.

agencies other than EPA are reserved the right to enforce other
laws and regulations "not inconsistent with this Act."
Citizen suits to enforce the discharge limitations, water quality
standards and permit provisions contained in Sections 301, 302, 306,
307, 401 and 402 of the Act are authorized in Section 505 by anyone
"having an interest which is or may be adversely affected." Suits
are to be prosecuted in the judicial district in which the offending
source is located, and the United States district courts are given
jurisdiction without regard to citizenship or amount in controversy. No citizen actions may be commenced until 60 days notice
has been given to the violator, 93 the state and EPA, and no action
may be commenced if either the state or EPA has commenced an
action (although in the latter event, citizens may intervene as a
matter of right). Citizen suits under the Act may not be instituted
until July 1, 1973, a proviso inserted, according to the House report,94 to give EPA and the states time to organize their 402 permit

programs.9 5 Section 505 specifically reserves citizens the right to
prosecute violations of the Act outside the Act under independent
common or statutory law (as, apparently, under nuisance or other
tort theories). Section 505 affords protection against unfounded
actions and harassment 0 by providing for the assessment of costs
(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any
party, and by the requirement for bond (at the discretion of the
court) where injunction is sought.
Section 504 gives EPA emergency powers to enjoin the discharge of any pollutant which poses imminent and substantial danger to health, welfare or livelihood.
Section 509 gives EPA subpoena powers over witnesses and
written evidence necessary for the discharge of its duty in drafting
regulations and guidelines for effluent limitations under Section
304, and in the taking of the national water quality inventory required by Section 305. In addition, Section 509 provides for judicial review of EPA action taken under Sections 301 and 302 (effluent discharge limitations and water-quality-related limitations),
Sections 306 and 307 (standards of performance for new sources,
toxic discharges and pretreatment standards), and Section 402
(permits). "Interested persons" must appeal the EPA action objected to within 90 days of the determination, denial, etc. 97

Ap-

93. The 60 days notice requirement is not required for violations of
Sections 306 (new sources) and 307 (toxic discharges).
94. H.R. 92-911 at 134.
95. Section 507 forbids retaliation against employees who institute or
participate in actions commenced under the Act. Section 9 of the Act suggests the possibility of establishing an environmental court system to
handle EPA cases, but the EPA is on record that a separate court system is
unnecessary. H.R. 92-911 at 171.
96. See H.R. 92-911 at 133-34.
97. The only statutory escape from the 90-day requirement appears
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peals of EPA action are to be taken in the circuit courts of appeal
of the United States. In those states where Section 402 permits
are issued by the state, and not by EPA, presumably appeals of
denied applications will proceed through the state court system as
provided for by state regulation. Denials of state certification under Section 401 are to be appealed through the state court system.9 8
Section 508 provides that no federal agency may enter into
any contract to be performed at a facility operated in violation of
the Act of 1972, if the owner, operator, etc., of the facility has been
convicted of violations of Section 301, 302, 306, 307, 308, or 402.
The prohibition continues until the violation has been corrected.

IV. EFFECT ON INDUSTRY OF THE PUBLIC
TREATMENT WORKS PROVISIONS
Title I199 of the Act of 1972 provides for grants to municipalities for the construction or improvement of public treatment
works. Along with the grants go various conditions upon how the
money is to be spent, some of which directly affect industrial users
of the treatment works. The emphasis of Title II is upon the development of area-wide plans for treatment of wastes. There are
elaborate statutory provisions for the state (and interstate) organizations necessary to the designation of the appropriate areas and
the interrelation of these areas. Area-wide treatment plans affect
industrial users in two ways. First, area-wide treatment of waste
will require that all private treatment plans be consistent with
the area plan. Second, area-wide treatment will require that discharges into public systems be pretreated to conform to the system's treatment capability.
Section 208 requires that area treatment plans include a program to regulate the location, modification, and construction of all
facilities which may result in any discharge within the area. Section 208 also requires that the area plan include a regulatory prograrn to insure compliance with all pretreatment requirements for
discharges into public systems. Section 307 (discussed above) provides that EPA shall issue pretreatment standards for all polluto be through a showing of excusable failure to present additional evidence
at the EPA proceeding.
98. Because the state-federal division of authority under Section 402
is contingent upon the conditions stated therein, much of the procedural
law involving Sections 401 and 402 will necessarily develop somewhat unsystematically.
99. No attempt will be made to synopsize or analyze Title II except as
it affects industrial users directly.

tants "which are determined not to be susceptible to treatment by
[public] treatment works or which would interfere with the operation of such works." Section 208 also provides that no Section
402 permit shall be issued for any point source which is in conflict
with an area-wide plan.100
The general effluent discharge limitations of Section 301,
which were discussed above as they apply to non-public point
sources, operate differently in the case of public treatment works.
For example, private point source control technology must be the
"best practicable control technology currently available" by July 1,
1977 (see above). But for public treatment works, the degree of
technology required is left up to EPA, which is to publish "information" on "the degree of effluent reductions attainable through
the application of secondary treatment."''1
By 1983, when private
point-source technology is supposed to be the "best available technology economically achievable," public treatment works technology is ordered to be the "best practicable waste treatment technology over the life of the works consistent with the purposes of this
title" (Title II). Whereas the House Committee took some pains to
define and elaborate private point-source limitations, no similar
effort appears to have been given to the public treatment standards of technology. The implications in the differences of phraseology between public and private technology requirements are at
present unknown, but it appears that the private source requirements are meant to be more rigorous.
Even though public treatment works may appear authorized
to operate with less stringent discharge elimination technology, the
imposition of pretreatment requirements under Section 307 (discussed above) is supposed to operate to erase any possible advantage to be gained by discharging into a public system, as opposed
to discharging directly into a waterway. 10 2 Consequently, the decision whether to discharge directly or through a public treatment
100. Public treatment works are required to obtain a Section 402 permit
just as any other discharge source. According to the House Conference
Report, industrial users of the public works will not have to obtain a Section 402 permit, but, of course, their discharges into the public system will
be controlled under the pre-treatment standards discussed in the text preceding this note. See gene?-ally H.R. 92-1465 at 130. Some legislators contend, however, that even dischargers into public treatment works will be
required to obtain Section 402 permits. See 118 CONG. REc. H9126 (daily
ed. Oct. 4, 1972).
101. The House Committee Report states that Section 301 requires the
application of the "best practicable waste treatment technology" in public
treatment works. H.R. 92-911 at 103. This interpretation does not appear
to be justified from a reading of the Act. (The compromise version which
emerged as the final bill did not change the language on which this committee report was based).
102. Public treatment works are required to obtain Section 401 certification and Section 402 permits, violation of the conditions of which can be
prosecuted by EPA (or the situs state). See Section 402(h).
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works "should be based solely on which method results in the
3s
same degree of treatment at less cost.'
A final provision of Title II directly applicable to industrial
users of public treatment systems is the requirement that all public systems receiving federal aid assess charges against industrial
users according to the portion of treatment allocable to them. Thus
section 204(b) was enacted to insure that industrial users pay
their "fair portion" of the costs of new construction. 10 4 The House
Committee report states that industrial use revenues are to be retained for use by the public system, and may not be used to grant
rebates or other "special treatment" to industrial users which
would thwart the objectives of the proportionate use assessment. 0 5
V.

POINTS OF TOPICAL INTEREST

A. The Act of 1972 as it Affects AEC Authority
The Act of 1972 has attempted to codify AEC and EPA responsibilities for the regulations of thermal and radioactive radiological waste discharges. Prior to the act, courts had variously
interpreted AEC responsibility for water quality protection. 10 6
The legislative history of the Act of 1972 adds significantly to the
interpretation of the plain language of the Act.
A literal reading of the Act appears to give EPA responsibility
for regulating thermal and radioactive waste discharges under the
general effluent limitations provisions of Section 301, because the
definition of "pollutant" includes both heat and radioactive materials. 071 Section 316(b) gives EPA the power to determine the
appropriate technology for point-source cooling water intake structures. Section 301 concludes by prohibiting the discharge of any
radiological or high-level radioactive waste "notwithstanding any
other provisions of this Act." Section 303, wherein water quality
standards are set forth, gives EPA final authority to establish
proper heat loads for identified bodies of water subject to thermal
103. ZENER at 107. It should also be remembered that discharges into
public systems are also subject to the monitoring and reporting requirements of § 308. See note 88 supra.
104. H.R. 92-911 at 91.
105. Id. at 92.
106. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969)
(holding that thermal pollution of waterways was a subject outside AEC
jurisdiction); Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that the AEC must consider water quality
effects of nuclear power plants).
107. Section 502(6) of the Act.

discharges. Section 316, as noted earlier, gives EPA the power to
ameliorate thermal discharge limitations in some circumstances.
Finally, Section 511 (c) (2) states that nothing contained in the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) shall be
deemed to:
A. Authorize any Federal agency authorized to license or
permit the conduct of any activity which may result in the
discharge of a pollutant into the navigable waters to review
any effluent limitation or other requirement established
pursuant to this Act or the adequacy of any certification
under Section 401 of this Act; or
B. authorize any such agency to impose, as a condition
precedent to the issuance of any license or permit, any effluent limitation other than any such limitation established pursuant to this Act.
A literal reading of the Act might lead to the conclusion that EPA
has the power to regulate thermal and radioactive/radiological
discharges into water, and that the AEC has neither the responsibility nor the power to limit or regulate either.
The legislative history of the Act reveals that such a broad, literal interpretation of EPA responsibility for radioactive discharges
was not intended. 0 8 Rather, it appears to have been the intention
of Congress that EPA jurisdiction over radioactive discharges
should not extend under the Act to radioactive materials covered
by the Atomic Energy Act. 10 9 How courts will read and interpret
the Act remains to be seen. However, until and unless EPA and
the AEC differ on discharge standards for radioactive materials,
the question of jurisdiction is not likely to be litigated. As a practical matter, however, EPA would probably defer to the AEC's obvious preeminence in the field. 110 In addition, Section 511 also
gives all federal agencies the power to issue regulations not
inconsistent with the Act, and unless EPA should find an AEC discharge standard for radioactive materials "inconsistent," AEC jurisdiction will remain undisturbed.''
While there may remain at least an academic question of AECEPA jurisdiction over radioactive materials, it seems clear that
EPA has been given complete responsibility for thermal discharge
standards. Nothing in the legislative history of the Act indicates
108. See, e.g., HR. 92-911 at 131; 117 CONG. Rzc. S 17401 (daily ed. Nov.
2, 1971); 118 CONG. REc. H9115 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972).
109. The House Report gives as examples of radioactive materials not
covered by the A.E.A., and, therefore, subject to EPA jurisdiction, radium
and accelerator-produced isotopes.
110. See Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Implementation of
Certain Complementary Responsibilities, 38 Fed. Reg. 2713 (1973), which
purports to divide EPA-AEC responsibilities.
111. See In the Matter of Long Is. Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nucleaer
Power Station No. 1), AEC Dkt. No. 50-322, Applicant's Memorandum filed
Nov. 21, 1972.
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that the plain language was intended to mean anything other than
it says.
Section 401, requiring state certification of compliance with
the provisions of the Act, states that where the state certifies that
no limitations have been established under the Act, such a certification shall not satisfy the requirements of Section 511(c). For example, if EPA has not promulgated effluent discharge limitations
or water quality standards applicable, then the federal licensing
agency by regulations under Section 304, and there are no state limitations agency (e.g., the AEC) appears to be back in its CalvertCliff's
position. 112 That is, it must perform an independent assessment of
environmental impact, and set such standards as are appropriate
upon a balance of costs and benefits. But, of course, once the applicant applies for a Section 402 permit, EPA (or a qualified state)
may exercise its authority thereunder to require limitations which
it finds necessary to meet the requirements of the Act. Thus, Calvert Cliff's appears to remain alive in the unlikely case of "no
standards" just described, although the Section 402 permit authority (EPA or the states) retains final power over water pollution questions.
Earlier discussion outlined the certification and permit requirements for AEC-approved projects.113
B. The Act of 1972 as it Affects the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA).
The Act of 1972 has affected NEPA in two ways. It has exempted EPA itself from certain NEPA requirements, and secondly,
it has limited the authority of other federal agencies, such as the
AEC, to review discharge or water quality standards under NEPA
authority. 1 4 Section 511(c), part of which is quoted in (A)
above, contains the crucial language bearing on the relation of the
Act of 1972 and NEPA.
Subparagraph (1) of Section 511(c) states that the environmental review required by NEPA" 5 will not be required for EPA
action, with the exception of public treatment works authorized
under Section 201 of the Act of 1972, and the issuance of a Section
402 permit for a new source defined in Section 306. The legislative
112. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
113. See Part II (B) supra.
114. Especially as required in the Calvert Cliffs decision cited in note
106 supra.
115. NEPA Section 102(2) (c).

history of the Act raises no questions about the plain meaning of
Subsection (1) of Section 511 (c). 116
With regard to federal agencies other than EPA, Section 511 (c)
(2), quoted above, precludes other agencies from reviewing effluent limitations or water quality standards. These areas have become the province of the EPA. However, Section 511(c) (2) has
not obviated water quality considerations in environmental analyses under NEPA. Federal agencies, other than EPA, must continue to perform NEPA functions such as assessment of total environmental impact of a project, comparison of alternatives to a
project, cost-benefit analysis, consideration of aesthetic and wildlife effects, etc.11 7 EPA is to determine all questions of effluent
limitation and water quality standards arising under the provisions of the Act of 1972. Other federal agencies are to take these
EPA determinations as "givens" when performing their duties
under NEPA. 11 The supposed division of authority between EPA
and other federal agencies is likely to raise serious questions about
the limits of Section 511(c) when the new procedures are put in
practice. When an "other" federal agency may have gone too far
in performing its NEPA duties and has consequently infringed
Section 511(c) is a question that can be settled only in practice,
perhaps case by case. As a minimum, the legislative history of
Section 511(c) seems to require statement and consideration of alternatives, using EPA standards as given data, in accordance with
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton." 9 On the other
side, it may have been the legislative intent that "other" federal
agencies can actually refuse a permit when, in their judgment, the
harm outweighs the benefits, even if EPA water standards are
met.1 20 The better view appears to be that while "other" federal
agencies have lost the power to set water quality or discharge
standards, they continue to be responsible for NEPA Section 102
impact statements and analyses, as a result of which a project may
be denied when all the pros and cons are added up, even when discharge or water quality standards under the Act have been met.12'
In other words, it appears that the "other" federal agency involved
116. See, e.g., 118 CONe. REc. H9119 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972).
117. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. H9119, H9126-27, S16878 (daily ed. Oct.
4, 1972); 117 CONG. REC. S17456 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1971), reprinted in H.R.
92-911 at 137-38.
118. At least one Senator expressed the view that the Act of 1972 precluded all federal agencies other than EPA from considering water questions in any context in performing their NEPA analyses, 118 CONG. REC.
S16888 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972). But the weight of authority appears to be
contra. See note 117 supra.
119. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
120. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REc. S16878, H9127 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972).
121. Section 511 (c) makes it clear that other federal agencies may not
condition the issuance of permits upon the meeting of higher standards.
But it appears that the same result could be accomplished indirectly through
NEPA § 102 balancing analysis.
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may grant or deny a permit on the basis of considerations which

include water parameters fixed by EPA, but that other federal
agencies may not, directly, condition permits upon the achievement
of discharge limitations or water quality standards other than
those set by EPA under the Act of 1972.
Vr.

CONCLUSION

The objectives of this paper are limited to presenting the highlights of the Act of 1972 and to outlining the procedural steps
toward compliance. It must be remembered that the Act is complex, and that it is still in its nascent stage, especially with regard
to working definitions and limitations, and actual procedural requirements. EPA is required by the Act to issue a large number of
implementing regulations, especially during 1973. Consequently,
everyone faced with the requirement of compliance with the Act
must consult the latest applicable regulations. Since states are
expected to commence the administration of the National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), as the Section 402 permit system is becoming known, state regulations as well as EPA
regulations will apply. No reliable answer to specific, actual questions of compliance can be given until both the situs state and the
factual conditions of the proposed discharge have been identified.
A careful reading of this paper will give the owner or operator
of a pollutant discharge source some idea of what the relevant
questions are, and what criteria will guide federal and state authorities in implementing the enforcement of the Act. But actual
decision-making concerning pollutant sources must necessarily involve future EPA regulations and direct negotiation with the appropriate enforcement agencies.
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